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BELT ROAD SEGREGATION AND ESCAPEWAYS - 




ABSTRACT: Segregation of conveyor roadways is a ventilation practice that is being increasingly 
applied in Australia. It is largely driven by the legislated requirements in Queensland pertaining to 
separation of escape ways from the mine. This legal requirement was based on a recommendation from 
the Moura No. 2 Wardens Inquiry into the mine disaster that claimed 11 lives. The report recommended 
“the introduction of a requirement for all underground mines to have one intake airway that is completely 
segregated from other parallel intake airways so as to provide two separate means of egress from the 
mine via an intake airway”. This recommendation seeks to assist mineworkers to escape from a mine 
after a fire by providing them with an airway that is free from smoke or contaminants. The concept of an 
airway being “completely segregated” is an ideal that is challenging to implement in practice when 
considering the effect of leakage. The practice of belt segregation is concerned with the potential for 
fires in the belt roadway although there are numerous other potential fire sources in underground coal 
mines. A review of segregation practices has been conducted applying ventilation engineering 
principles. Four different scenarios have been analysed with regard to the effectiveness of the 
segregation stoppings in preventing potential fire contaminants migrating to other parts of the mine. The 
results show that in some cases the benefits of segregation to a person evacuating a mine in the event 
of a fire range from beneficial to detrimental. This is influenced by many factors including the location of 
that individual in that particular mine. There is room for improvement in the design and implementation of 
escape ways in underground coal mines. Escape ways need to be planned and designated with regard 
to the potential sources of fire, pressure differentials between escape ways and the operational 
practicalities of maintaining the pressure differential between them. 
INTRODUCTION 
The term “segregation” is used widely in the Australian underground coal industry today but this term 
cannot be found in any legislation relating to underground coal mining. The intent of this paper is to 
identify the origins, reason and purpose for segregation and also to assess its practical effectiveness. It 
is worth noting that this paper is focused on the modelling of contaminants from fires on main conveyors 
and that there are other types of mine fires or “reasonably foreseeable events” that can cause the 
intakes of a mine to become contaminated. The reason for this is in response to the industry practice of 
belt road segregation as means of mitigating the risks to underground personnel in the event of a belt 
fire. 
 
Maintaining separated intake escapeways is a legal requirement in Queensland and one that is often 
complied with by segregation of the main belt road from the main travel road. Mines inspectors ensure 
compliance with the legislation by enforcing the segregation of the belt road at individual sites by issuing 
directives to bring the segregation into compliance. For the mining operation the segregation of the belt 
road is often a nuisance as it limits access to the belt road. It can be a headache for the ventilation 
officer to control and maintain as there is often operational requirements to breach the segregation 
stoppings for access purposes. 
 
Mining operation invest considerable amounts of time and money in the installation and maintenance of 
these ventilation control devices. It is important that they are serving a purpose and reducing the risk to 
underground personnel. If they are not, then they are a waste of time and money and are providing a 
false sense of security to underground personnel and management at the mine.  
HISTORY IN AUSTRALIA 
The legal requirement for belt segregation started in the Queensland coal mining legislation in the 
1970s. The Queensland Coal Mining Act 1925-1981 General Rules for Underground Coal Mines 
(Queensland Government 1981) rr. 4.2 stated: 
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“(1) In an underground coal mine other than a mine existing at 1st July, 1978, provisioning shall be made 
for an intake airway other than a roadway containing a belt conveyor. This requirement shall apply to 
any part of such mine other than a panel or sub-panel where the method of working limits the number of 
roadways to less than three: Provided that in the initial development of a new mine the belt conveyor 
roadway may serve as the only intake airway for such time as is reasonably required to provide a 
second intake roadway. 
 
(2) All belt conveyor roadways shall be segregated from other intake airways and from return airways”. 
 
This rule was very specific about what was required and when it was required.  
 
The current legislation in Queensland does not call for belt segregation. Section 296 of the Coal Mining 
Safety and Health Regulation 2001(Queensland Government, 2001) calls for two intake escapeways to 
be established that are separated in a way to prevent any reasonably foreseeable event happening in 
one of the escapeways affecting the ability of persons to escape through the other escapeway. In 
Schedule 4 - Ventilation control devices and design criteria, the stoppings used for establishing 
separation are specified as being of substantial construction with no overpressure rating. This section of 
the regulations came about in response to a recommendation on p67 of the Wardens Inquiry Report for 
the Moura No. 2 Mine Explosion, which called for: “the introduction of a requirement for all underground 
mines to have one intake airway that is completely segregated from other parallel intake airways so as 
to provide two separate means of egress from the mine via an intake airway”. 
 
Despite the change in legal requirement the practice of belt segregation is often used to achieve the 
requirement for two intake escapeways. 
 
It is also worth noting that s296 of the CMS and HR 2001 is part of Division 4 of Part 9 which deals with 
mine design and that it is an obligation of the Site Senior Executive and not the Ventilation Officer to 
ensure that this is in place. The Ventilation Officer is however usually tasked with the responsibility of 
ensuring this is compliant. This responsibility is often begrudgingly accepted, as it is a constraint that is 
in some cases a hindrance to the ventilation of the mine. It is not surprising then that the separation of 
escapeways is not planned and modeled to the same extent as the ventilation of production panels. 
 
The Queensland Mines Inspectorate issued a Safety Bulletin titled, “Lessons of mine segregation must 
be applied” (Taylor, 2008). This Safety Bulletin explains the legislated requirements and the origin of 
these requirements. It also warns operations that non-compliance with this requirement will result in a 
directive to suspend operations being issued under section 167 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 
1999 (Queensland Government, 1999). 
 
In NSW there is no requirement for two escapeways in intake air. Some mines have implemented a 
separate escapeway in intake air to part of the mine. The legal requirement for escapeways or means of 
egress is in cl 45 of the NSW Coal Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2006 (NSW Government, 2006) 
 
(b) (iv) at least 2 means of egress from each production area or other part of the mine to the surface part 




The United Sates has very prescriptive requirements on segregation of conveyor roadways. The 
principle that is applied is that no air from a conveyor roadway is allowed to ventilate a working face. 
Leakage through ventilation control devices is included in this requirement and results in the practice of 
ensuring the pressure in the conveyor roadway is always less that the pressure in the travel road. This is 
achieved in practice by the routine placement of regulators in the conveyor roadway and overcasts 
where necessary to dump conveyor roadway air to the return airway. 
 
These requirements come from § 75.350 of the Title 30 Code of Federal Regulations (30 CFR) (Federal 
Government of USA, 2008), which include the following: 
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(a) The belt air course must not be used as a return air course; and except as provided in paragraph (b) 
of this section, the belt air course must not be used to provide air to working sections or to areas where 
mechanized mining equipment is being installed or removed. 
 
(1) The belt air course must be separated with permanent ventilation controls from return air courses 
and from other intake air courses except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section. 
 
The double fatality at the Aracoma Alma No. 1 Mine in 2006 after a conveyor fire filled the primary 
escapeway of a working section with thick smoke increased the focus placed on this section of the 30 




In South Africa the Regulations under section 98 of the Mine Health and Safety Act, 1996 (Act No. 29 of 
1996) call for two means of egress from the mine (Government of South Africa, 1996). There is no 
requirement for the provision of two separate intake airways or for the segregation of belt roadways from 
intake air. The safety systems for dealing with mine fires rely on: 
 
 Emergency lifelines 
 Establishing refuge chambers with borehole to the surface and small fan for fresh air supply 




The UK contains similar legislative requirements to those required under the Queensland legislation but 
contains some more clarity on when the requirements are applicable. The Mines (Safety of Exit) 
Regulations 1988 Regulation 9 (Government of the United Kindom, 1998) states the following: 
 
Intake airways 
9. The manager shall ensure that, apart from those persons who are going to or leaving their place of 
work at the beginning or end of a shift, not more than 50 persons are employed below ground in any part 
of the mine unless; 
(a) there are two separate intake airways into that part of the mine which are connected only in such a 
way that in the event of a fire, transmission of the products of combustion from one airway to the other is 
prevented so far as is reasonably practicable; or 
(b) there is one intake airway which is constructed of suitable fire resistant materials and is free, so far 
as is reasonably practicable, from the risk of fire. 
 
In addition to this regulation there is a requirement for at least two means of egress to the surface, ie. an 
intake and a return. 
DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
From looking at the different segregation practices used locally and around the world several different 
concepts emerge. These may not be immediately clear so they are listed below: 
 
1. No segregation of intake roadways 
2. Segregation of the belt to prevent belt fire contaminants entering intake roadways 
3. Segregation of the belt to prevent belt fire contaminants entering working faces 
4. Provision of a separated intake airway for use as an escapeway 
 
These four different approaches all have advantages and disadvantages and different levels of 
complexity with regard to implementation. 
 
It is important to understand what is trying to be achieved before an appropriate arrangement can be 
adopted. Too often, it seems, segregation stoppings are installed purely from a compliance standpoint 
with little understanding or interest in the purpose or effectiveness. 
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MINE SCENARIOS 
For the purpose of analysis of belt segregation four different mine layouts were used to model the 
effectiveness of the segregation. The first scenario, called Case 0 is a conceptual model and does not 
represent the workings of an actual mine. This was used so that any ventilation layouts and analysis 
results could be published without concern for confidentiality. The other three scenarios, called Case 1, 
Case 2 and Case 3 are based on the ventilation models from actual longwall coal mines in Queensland, 






Pressure gradient plots were generated for each scenario. These display the relative static pressure in 
the mine roadway from the surface intake to the longwall and along the return back to the main fans. The 
belt road pressure gradient was also plotted. The pressure gradients of any additional separated intake 




A 100 ppm contamination was placed into the model inside the belt portal and then modeled to see 
where the contaminant would migrate throughout the mine. This test was applied to each of the 
scenarios and the results recorded. The models were then modified with all the segregation stoppings in 
the mine removed and the same 100 ppm contamination test reapplied. This allowed the two results for 
the same mine to be compared. One set of results with segregation stoppings in place and one with the 
segregation stopping removed. This was used so the effectiveness of the segregation stoppings of the 
scenario could be measured. It is important to note that the numerical value of the contamination 
concentration in the results table in only relevant with respect to the 100 ppm contaminant that was used 
for the test. It is primarily for comparison between models and between segregation and no segregation. 
For example, a 20 ppm contamination in a primary escapeway may appear to be acceptable until you 
consider that if the contamination at the belt portal was 1000 ppm then the concentration in the 
escapeway would be 200 ppm. Table 1 displays the model results for each scenario with the 
segregation stoppings in place and also with the segregation stoppings removed. 
 
Table 1 - Contamination test - Modelled segregation stopping effectiveness 
 




157 100 14 76 16 14 18 or 4*
0 100 31 28 30 27 33 or27*
203 100 7 30 25 0 31
0 100 17 22 21 1 22
106 100 53 15 1 1 6
0 100 53 1 7 0 31
64 100 21 44 29 44 26
0 100 22 26 24 25 29









Modeled Contaminant Concentration (ppm)
 
 
The purpose of this test is to measure the effectiveness of segregation stoppings to reduce the spread of 
contaminants to other parts of the mine. No consideration has been given to the dynamic nature of a fire, 




The ventilation layout for Case 0 is shown in Figure 1. This fictitious mine consists of seven heading 
mains, 3 headings with flanking returns and a segregated belt road in the middle heading. As the mine 
does not exist there is not a designated primary escapeway. There are two results for the contaminant 
test for the primary escapeway shown in Table 1 depending on which set of intake roadways is adopted 
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as the primary escapeway. The results show that with the 157 segregation stoppings in place the 
contaminant is directed predominantly into the mains development area with a concentration of 76 ppm. 
The other three panels (including LW) modeled a contamination around 15 ppm. The greatest benefit 
modelled with this arrangement of segregation was the contaminant concentration of 4 ppm adjacent to 
the 76 ppm in the mains. The 4 ppm result came from the single intake airway to the left of the middle 
heading belt road in Figure 1. 
 
The reason for the relatively low level of contamination can be seen in the pressure gradient plot for 
Case 0 in Figure 2. The heading that returned the result of 4 ppm is referred to in Figure 2 as “Primary”. 
This heading for the most part sat at a higher static pressure than the surrounding roads particularly the 
belt road where the contaminant was concentrated. This resulted in leakage paths flowing away from 
this “Primary” heading. The instances where the static pressure in this roadway drops below the belt 
road is due to the placement of segregated belt underpasses that were put into the model to allow for 
transport movements (operational requirement) and balancing of the intake airway pressures. It is this 
balancing that has caused the drop in static pressure to below that of the belt road in some instances. 
This could be mitigated in practice by the installation of machine doors at the segregated underpasses. 
The results in Table 1 also show that by removing all segregation from the model all inbye areas of the 













Case 1 is based on a longwall mine in the Bowen Basin in Queensland, Australia. The trunk conveyor of 
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primary escapeway of the mine is the main travel road. The contaminant test in Table 1 shows some 
very interesting and unexpected results. The highest contaminant results with the segregation stoppings 
in place were 31 ppm in the primary escapeway, 30 ppm in the mains development panel and 25 ppm in 
one of the gateroads. Without the segregation stoppings in place the most significant result was the 
reduction of contaminant in the primary escapeway by 30% down to 22 ppm. The longwall result 
increased from 7 ppm to 17 ppm without the segregation stoppings in place and the mains development 
and one of the gateroads both had reductions in the level of contaminant. As expected, the contaminant 
was more spread out and diluted without the segregation stoppings and more concentrated in particular 
areas. 
 
The pressure gradient plot for Case 1 in Figure 3 shows the belt road at a higher pressure than the 
primary escapeway most of the time. The first 1000 m the primary escapeway and the belt are in 
separate drifts so the leakage would be almost non-existent. The time where the primary escapeway sits 
above the belt road in static pressure around the 2000 m mark is due to a significant reduction in the 
number of main headings which causes the static pressure of primary escapeway to peak in this area. It 
is possible to see that the general pressure gradient trend of the segregated belt road is flatter than that 
of the primary escapeway causing the belt road to be at a higher static pressure than the primary 
escapeway. This results in the leakage of contaminant into the primary escapeway in the event of a belt 
fire. This scenario had 17 vehicle doors positioned along the trunk belt system. This highlights the need 









Case 2 is based on a longwall mine in the Bowen Basin in Queensland, Australia. The trunk conveyor of 
the mine is generally segregated on both sides from the surrounding intakes with 106 segregation 
stoppings. The primary escapeway of the mine is the main travel road. This scenario involved the most 
elaborate layout for segregation of the belt road of all the scenarios analysed. Table 1 shows that the 
contaminant result for the longwall face is 53 ppm regardless of whether the segregation stoppings are 
in place or not. The mains development panel showed a reduction of 15 ppm to 1 ppm with the removal 
of the segregation stoppings and another development panel showed a rise from 1 ppm to 7 ppm. The 
primary escapeway however showed a significant increase from 6 ppm to 31 ppm with the removal of 
the segregation stoppings. The pressure gradient plot for Case 2 shown in Figure 4 shows the extent 
that this particular operation has gone to get the pressure in the belt road to below the pressure in the 
primary escapeway (travel road). 
 
The step in the pressure gradient for the belt road at the 2000 m mark is due to the placement of a 
regulator and an air dump in the belt road. This does a good job to reduce the pressure of the belt road 
and largely prevents leakage of the contaminant into the primary escapeway. The infrequent instances 
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result of 6 ppm. The air dump directs air out of the belt road into adjacent intake roadways. It is this air 








Case 3 is based on a longwall mine in the Bowen Basin in Queensland, Australia. The trunk conveyor of 
the mine is generally segregated on both sides from the surrounding intakes with 64 segregation 
stoppings. The primary escapeway of the mine is a roadway separate from the main travel road and on 
the other side of the trunk conveyor. This scenario initially showed the most promise for having a simple 
design and maintaining a primary escapeway at a pressure above the adjacent belt road. The pressure 
gradient plot in Figure 5 shows that this is not the case. The belt road is generally at a greater static 
pressure than the adjacent primary escapeway. This is reflected in the results in Table 1 with arguable 
better results achieved with the segregation stoppings removed from the model. The primary escapeway 
showed an increase in contaminant concentration from 26 ppm to 29 ppm with the segregation 
stoppings removed. 
 
There are two ways this scenario could be dramatically improved. The primary escapeway loses 
significant pressure early in the mains due to a segregated belt underpass. This allows air to travel from 
the primary escapeway to the travel road. This could be easily corrected with the installation of a vehicle 
door. Additionally there is a 200 Pa pressure drop in the belt road around the 2500 m mark. This is due 
to a high resistance Ventilation Control Device (VCD) located in the belt road. This VCD would have very 
likely been installed to achieve compliance with belt segregation. The result is an increase in the static 
pressure of the belt road and the increased level of contamination of the primary escapeway in the event 
of a belt fire. In fact the primary escapeway suffers less contamination if this VCD is removed from the 
model. This is a good example of where compliance does not necessarily result in lower risk. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A line of stoppings will not prevent contaminants from a belt fire entering a primary escapeway if the belt 
road is at a higher static pressure than the primary escapeway. For the examples analysed, segregation 
of the belt road from all other roadways usually resulted in the belt road being at a higher pressure than 
surrounding intake airways. 
 
Consideration needs to be given to the static pressure differential between separated escapeways. The 
only way to ensure that a contaminant does not enter the primary escapeway is to ventilate the mine 
such that the primary escapeway is generally at a higher pressure than the surround roadways. Ideally 
the primary escapeway should have the highest static pressure of any adjacent roadways. 
 
Consideration should be given to establishing primary escapeways that are not the main travel road in 
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 Provide a primary escapeway for the full length of the main headings free from contaminants in 
the event of a fire in the belt road or travel road 
 To better meet the requirements of s298 of the Qld CMS and H Reg 2001 for primary 
escapeways. Specifically “As far as practicable, free from the risk of fire” 
 Ease of access to the belt road and less issues with damaged stoppings or leaking vehicle doors 
 Improve early detection of heatings and small fires(ie. via smell) 
 
Consideration should be given to putting more focus on reducing the level of risk to personnel than just 
being compliant. There are several examples from the modelling conducted where compliance is 
achieved but a more hazardous result is also achieved. 
 
Based on the modelling work conducted the following observations have been made: 
 
 In the event of a belt fire, segregation of the conveyor roadway will result in the smoke 
generated by the fire being concentrated in particular areas of the mine. This will usually be the 





Figure 5 - Case 3 – pressure plot 
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